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ABSTRACT
The establishment of the communist regime in Poland in 1944 is a current subject of reflection 
in the doctrine and practice of legislation and judiciary. There has been no uniform position on these 
events, which means that the then sanctioned political and normative order continues to produce 
controversial assessments and, above all, certain legal effects. This results from the fact that the new 
people’s power, empowered by force, and not by legal or social basis, has given itself the competence 
to establish a normative order. The lack of legitimacy for the rightful rule and legislative activity, in 
principle – from the point of view of the idea of the rule of law – undermines the political and legal 
status of the people’s authorities. This is all the more so because the system of unified power and 
sources of law created at that time was evidence of building a totalitarian state modelled on the Soviet 
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Union. The events and legal behaviours of that time led to numerous, often radical changes in many 
areas of private and public life. They caused certain social and material effects, difficult to reverse 
today, which Polish society still faces. Therefore, modern standards of the rule of law require that 
public authorities undertake comprehensive and effective activity. They require that the principles of 
just and fair compensation for material damage and compensation for moral losses resulting from the 
rule of this system be implemented. This seems all the more important because some regulations of 
the people’s power, especially those concerning changes in the ownership structure, are still in force 
and form the basis of court and Constitutional Tribunal decisions.
Keywords: State National Council; Polish Committee of National Liberation; Poland; communist 
regime; Poland
INTRODUCTION
The liberal concept of Rechtstaat (similar to the Anglo-Saxon idea of the rule 
of law), originally proposed at the turn of the 19th century in continental Europe, 
gave the subsequent decades the feature of generally accepted standards of law-
fulness of state’s activity. The approach to legitimacy of public bodies and the 
legality of legal acts in force, defined in more detail by scholars and practitioners 
of legal positivism, began to be treated as a conditio sine qua non of the political 
organisation of the state and a guarantee of civil freedom rights. This kind of a new 
juristic culture, recognizing the supremacy of law over political decisions and 
actions, was, however, brutally confronted in the 20th century with a diametrically 
different approach pursued in totalitarian systems. These countries’ ruling elites 
had caused that the legitimacy of the rule of law mechanisms of state governance 
was questioned, including the collapse of the authority of law, allowing for the 
monopolization of power, the dictate of violence, and finally the use of fait ac-
compli methods. The societies of Central and Eastern Europe, which pursuant to 
the agreements made by the Big Three (undertaken without respecting the will of 
the majority of citizens of the countries of this region) were subordinated to the 
omnipotent and unlimited influence of the Soviet Union, suffered particularly severe 
and long-lasting effects of arbitrary behaviour by public authorities. The situation of 
the Republic of Poland is a clear example here: its inhabitants felt the totalitarian, 
German and Soviet way of exercising power as early as in September 1939, and 
then from mid-1944, in the areas west of the Bug and San, were subjected to the 
actions of the self-proclaimed communist centre of power. These people, with the 
planned and active participation of Soviet Russia, which had a negative attitude 
towards sovereignty of the Polish state, led to the negation of the legality of the 
London government (the Polish government in exile) and to a rapid, multifaceted 
transformation of the political system of our state.
The importance of these events, especially those that took place in 1944 due 
to the method of appointing (by Stalin’s arbitrary decision) the State National 
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Council (Krajowa Rada Narodowa, hereinafter: KRN) and the Polish Committee 
for National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego, hereinafter: 
PKWN), and due to the arbitrary granting them certain sovereign powers, from 
the very beginning occupied a significant place in the research of Polish scientific 
community, and the interest in the subject matter has been still fervent to this day. 
At the same time, diversified and temporally varying interpretations of these events 
and their legal consequences appear. As it seems, the exploration of this issue has 
been dictated not only by the need to document this important episode in the history 
of Poland, but also by the need to pursue a specific historical narrative (especially 
in the times of the People’s Republic of Poland), allowing for making credible the 
genesis of the people’s character of the state after World War II. However, while 
scholars in the field are rather unanimous about the ground-breaking significance 
of the fact of political transformations in Poland in 1944, numerous doubts arise 
and there is no unanimity among them regarding whether the systemic and legal 
continuity between the Second Polish Republic and the People’s Republic of Poland 
was maintained or broken, and, consequently, about the recognition or rejection 
of the legacy of the Polish People’s Republic by the Third Polish Republic. In this 
context, it seems particularly noteworthy to reflect on the legality1 of the communist 
state bodies and, consequently, on the legitimacy of their normative actions. This 
research area, of course, used to be discussed in numerous publications from the 
1 We refer to the classic understanding of the legal, “legitimate” authority, distinguished (along-
side the charismatic and traditional types) by the eminent sociologist and political theorist Max Weber. 
He put them in terms of legal and procedural categories, which were intended to be a conditio sine qua 
non for the legitimacy and the reasonableness of authority. However, based on this rather idealistic 
classification, numerous (over)interpretations of the legitimacy of authority have appeared in the 
literature on the subject, especially those referring to the socio-ideological or moral form of it. They 
point to the possibility of applying non-legal or even non-evaluative arguments and techniques of 
legitimisation of power (related, inter alia, to the institutionalisation of social life, the variability of 
forms of political participation, the so-called “social legitimisation situation” or, finally, to the sanc-
tioning of initially usurpatory power of the sovereign). Their proper selection by an entity aspiring to 
gain (and maintain) power was to encourage citizens to adopt an attitude of obedience towards this 
entity. Among these arguments, particular attention is paid to the effectiveness or efficiency of the 
authority, which are supposed to justify a claim to power of even an illegal, revolutionary regime, 
or allow granting a sanction to a mass system of rituals taking place between the ruling group and 
the rest of society (e.g. in socialist states, the admission of members to collectives or participation in 
political feasts). See J. Rotschild, Legitymizacja polityczna we współczesnej Europie, [in:] Władza 
i polityka. Wybór tekstów ze współczesnej politologii zachodniej, ed. A. Ankwicz, Warszawa 1986, 
pp. 62–64; Ch. Lane, Socjalistyczny rytuał a legitymacja władzy, [in:] Władza i polityka…, p. 91, 
reported after T. Biernat, Legitymizacja władzy politycznej. Elementy teorii, Toruń 1999, pp. 90–96. 
Cf. P. Winczorek, Legitymizacja władzy politycznej, „Państwo i Prawo” 1985, no. 11–12, pp. 65–76. 
These studies inspired by the Weberian theory may have been an attempt to explain the undoubtedly 
illegal takeover of power by the Bolsheviks in Russia, as well as the establishment of the communist 
regime in Poland and other regions of the world.




124 Ewa Kozerska, Katarzyna Dziewulska
period of the People’s Republic of Poland2 and still is a fascinating object of study 
for the humanities and social sciences. Nonetheless, in our opinion, it does not lose 
its relevance, since the ambiguous attitude about continuation or discontinuation 
of the system in transition from the Second Republic to the Third Republic,3 seen 
in legal science and legislative and judicial practice, still has serious consequences 
in the institutional and normative functioning of the Polish state. In particular, it 
is measurably reflected in the shaping of the political systemic identity, as well as 
in the legal tradition. Moreover, it is worth noting that shortcomings in this area 
substantially complicate, and sometimes even prevent, the definition of the status 
of an individual and the guarantees of their rights (particularly in terms of the le-
gitimate acquisition of subjective rights), which, in turn, determine the content of 
powers and the scope of the mobilisation of State bodies. As it seems, the lack of 
a clearly unambiguous will to interpret the legitimacy of the communist govern-
ment in 1944 for its legislative activity results in the polarisation of the positions 
of various sectors of the governing bodies of the state. This is a serious problem, 
due to still numerous formal and legal claims of citizens and legal persons who 
are expecting a certain form of compensation for the damage suffered by them. 
This heterogeneity in the activity of representatives of the public authority also 
strongly limits the creation of an effective conviction, both in the public and at 
the level of formulating the rudimentary foundations of the state, that the political 
community implements both the substantive and formal requirements of the rule 
of law in a balanced manner.
Below, the statements of legal scholars who were renowned figures at a given 
time (including representatives of constitutional law and history of the Polish po-
litical system and law) and historians are presented, which will allow us to indicate 
the dominant tendencies in the analysis of the significance of the events of 1944 
and their possible impact on the current discourse about them.
POSITIONS OF THE POST-WAR LEGAL SCHOLARLY OPINION
Let us note here that with the advent and consolidation of the so-called people’s 
rule, the propaganda and legal practice implemented by the regime expressed the 
thesis that there was an absolute need to consider the existing radical systemic 
changes as an expression of “historical necessity”, in which the class-conscious 
2 The name “People’s Poland” used herein is an established convention for referring to the 
political-system situation in which the current Polish lands found themselves in the period 1944–1989.
3 For more detail, see E. Kozerska, T. Scheffler, Retoryka ciągłości: o dziedzictwie prawnym 
II Rzeczypospolitej i rządów komunistycznych, „Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem” 2017, 
vol. 39(2), pp. 53–79.
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working part of society (working class) allegedly had a key role to play.4 The need 
to create an effectively credible narrative required that the legitimisation of both 
government bodies (especially the State National Council) be sought simultane-
ously (as Zbigniew Wawak rightly stated) on the ideological level and based on the 
domestic and, to a lesser extent, international legal system.5 This apt thesis is well 
reflected in the statements of Stefan Rozmaryn, a professor of law at the University 
of Warsaw and the main author of the Constitution of 1952. This leading Polish 
constitutionalist of Marxist provenance derived the powers of the State National 
Council from a purely declarative (and not constitutive) act announced in December 
1943 by several groups of leftist and military character in the form of the “Manifesto 
of democratic socio-political and military organizations in Poland”. The provisions 
of this document stated that this body, established on the initiative of Władysław 
Gomułka and completely subordinated to the Polish Workers’ Party (Polska Partia 
Robotnicza, PPR), had a real political delegacy from the Polish nation, as it was 
“a representation of the nation’s most progressive forces and the ruthless struggle 
against the reactionary camp”.6 Thus, it was considered to embody a wide spectrum 
of Polish anti-fascist democratic circles, excluding the possibility of representatives 
of the Sanation movement (Sanacja) or the National Democratic Party from par-
ticipating in power. As S. Rozmaryn stressed, in the “period of restitution of state 
organs” the KRN was therefore authorized to act on behalf of the Polish nation and 
to guide its fate. Its position was to be additionally strengthened by the prerogative 
to manage the communist armed forces. In addition, the supreme authority granted 
to the KRN (due to allegedly being an authentic representation of the nation) was 
to gain additional confirmation in the so-called July Manifesto (dated 22 July 
1944), in which the KRN was recognized as the only source of legal power in the 
country and defined as a temporary parliament supported by the broad masses. In 
S. Rozmaryn’s opinion, the legitimisation of this body resulted at the same time in 
an absolute breach of continuity with the authority of the “landowners and capi-
talists” established in the Second Republic of Poland. This author was convinced 
that KRN embodied the class opposite of the pejoratively defined administrators of 
the pre-war Polish state. What is also significant, a meaningful statement appeared 
in the findings of this communist researcher that the KRN’s legitimacy had not 
stemmed from the formal regulations of the constitutions in force during the Sec-
ond Republic of Poland, but from the will of the working class, most notably by 
4 Cf. W. Dworakowski, Klasa robotnicza-awangarda narodu, [in:] O Konstytucji Polskiej 
Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej. Zbiór materiałów, Warszawa 1953, p. 31.
5 Z. Wawak, Legitymacja prawna KRN, „Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny” 
1993, no. 4, p. 51.
6 Manifest demokratycznych organizacji społeczno-politycznych i wojskowych w Polsce, 
https://jbc.bj.uj.edu.pl/dlibra/publication/410102/edition/420906/content [access: 12.10.2019]; 
S. Rozmaryn, Polskie prawo państwowe, Warszawa 1951, p. 244.
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workers.7 He, therefore, stressed that the proletariat, by leading the popular masses 
and in alliance with the USSR, had carried out a national liberation revolution on 
Polish soil.8 He argued further that, as the highest authority in the state, KRN was 
a body empowered to enact both ordinary and constitutional legislation. Thus, it 
could “amend and repeal the provisions of the March Constitution without special 
formalities” (while simultaneously and unequivocally questioning the binding force 
of the Constitution of 1935), the partial restoration of which could also only take 
place at its will.9 At the same time, he used to explain the establishment of com-
7 S. Rozmaryn, op. cit., p. 253. It is worth noting here that two Polish well-known specialists 
in constitutional law – Zdzisław Jarosz and Janina Zakrzewska (Krajowa Rada Narodowa. Z dzie-
jów kształtowania się ludowego parlamentu, „Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne” 1964, vol. 16(1), 
pp. 55–56) – reduced the problem of legality of the KRN and its powers to two aspects, which were 
to give credibility to the status of this body: on the one hand, to the actual formation of this entity as 
the supreme state authority and, on the other, to its formal and legal aspect, recognizing the Statutes 
of the Provisional National Councils of 1 January 1944 and the principle of the Manifesto of PKWN 
(of not statutory but political agenda character) as a normative source of its authority. Another Polish 
professor of constitutional law and a member of the Presidium Bureau of the KRN (1946–1947) 
– Kazimierz Biskupski (Rady narodowe. Wykład o ustroju i komentarz do ustawy, compiled by 
K. Biskupski, J. Starościak, Warszawa 1948, p. 9) – tried to convince that the KRN was established 
by agreement of the so-called Polish democratic camp and established a link with the broad masses 
as early as in the wartime conspiratorial conditions. Unlike the reactionary camp, it allegedly gained 
public support through national councils emerging at all levels of administration.
8 S. Rozmaryn, op. cit., p. 253. A similar argument was expressed by constitutionalist Wiesław 
Skrzydło (Kształtowanie się aparatu państwowego w okresie PKWN, „Roczniki Lubelskie” 1964, 
vol. 7, p. 26, 30) who stated that so-called people’s authority emerged from the social revolution against 
the bourgeoisie and did not need to be authorised under the legal norms of the Second Republic. He 
considered that the new authority was not bound by them and it could, at its own discretion, sanction 
them to a certain extent and limits. Accordingly, there was no restitution of the former state apparatus, 
because the current power emerged in the course of revolutionary changes, and its legitimacy was 
supposed to be based on, vaguely defined, the will of the nation at war.
9 In this context, interesting considerations come from an eminent law theorist, Professor An-
toni Peretiatkowicz (Konstytucja Marcowa a Konstytucja Lutowa, „Państwo i Prawo” 1947, no. 11, 
pp. 56–60), who stated that even the validity of the March Constitution in the first two years after 
World War II was a contentious issue. However, this problem has only led to deliberations as to whether 
the binding effect results from the content of the whole act or only its political guidelines. In contrast 
to the view of Professor Andrzej Mycielski (Polskie prawo polityczne, Kraków 1947), a renowned 
specialist in state law, he argued that post-war legislation and constitutional practice did not refer to 
the literal and comprehensive validity of the Constitution of 1921. If that had been the case, it could 
have been considered illegal for formal reasons. Therefore, A. Peretiatkowicz demonstrated that 
binding effect could only be attributed to the basic assumptions of this constitution, which were not 
expressly formulated and therefore did not constitute legal norms. They should be treated as directives, 
guidelines for the legislature. On the basis of this argument, he concluded that the legal authority of 
the KRN did not come from the Constitution of 1921. At the same time, he considered that the basic 
principles of this Constitution were in force under the “revolutionary, sovereign” decision of the 
KRN and the July Manifesto. This intellectual construct allowed the professor to provide on the basis 
of positive law, as he himself pointed out, credibility to the sovereignty of the KRN and its powers 
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munist rule by the need to unmask the false policy of the government-in-exile and 
its delegation in Poland, which could not legitimise itself by the will of the people, 
as “their so-called legality” resulted from the fascist and illegally imposed April 
Constitution of 1935. Therefore, in S. Rozmaryn’s view, KRN was a representative 
body, even though – due to the post-war conditions – established in a non-election 
process, but one whose essence of legitimacy was to result from “the identical 
aspirations of the representatives and the represented”.10
Additional arguments in the context of providing credibility for the KRN were 
proposed by another Polish communist constitutionalist, Feliks Siemieński, who 
analysed the genesis of people’s authority in Poland on the basis of the theory of the 
creator of state socialism, Ferdinand Lassalle. Directly referring to the quite signif-
icant Lassalle’s (materialistically approached) dualistic concept of the constitution, 
he argued that it is a so-called actual constitution expressed in the current system 
of social forces, not a written one (equated with the comprehensive regulation 
of the state system), that determines the political-legal order in a given state. He 
argued that only current circumstances made it possible to give significance to the 
constitution in the system of law.11 This system has never remained unchangeable, 
since in F. Siemieński’s view it was evolving towards the empowerment of the 
working masses. In his opinion, this caused that the formal constitution (“written 
constitution”) “can undergo and certainly undergoes almost deterministic changes”. 
Hence, the communist authorities did not invoke the law in force, but the will of 
the people, seeking the normative authorisation in it. He stated that the Manifesto 
and the normative acts adopted by the KRN and the PKWN clearly indicated the 
revolutionary nature of establishment of these bodies, which were the result of 
the then current arrangement of social forces.12 In this context, it is also worth 
mentioning the important statement by a prominent jurist of Kraków, Professor 
Konstanty Grzybowski. He wrote, without deluding himself, that in the post-war 
circumstances, “we are dealing with the original emergence of a new power, not 
its derivative establishment based on an existing and formally binding (although 
brought down by force) legal order. We are dealing with a revolution, not a formally 
to arbitrarily interpret and recognize the assumptions of the Act of 1921. It also made it possible 
to attest the legality of post-war legislation, including specific institutional and legal changes. Cf. 
J. Trzciński, Zagadnienie obowiązywania konstytucji z 17 marca 1921 w latach 1944–52, „Przegląd 
Prawa i Administracji” 1974, no. 5, p. 14 ff. Like most post-war Polish constitutionalists, J. Trzciński 
considered the norms of the March Constitution still in force during the Period of People’s Republic 
of Poland as long as they were recognized as binding in the then applicable legislation.
10 Cf. Z. Jarosz, J. Zakrzewska, op. cit., pp. 9–22; K. Biskupski, op. cit., p. 16.
11 In a broader perspective: F. Lassalle, O istocie konstytucji, Warszawa 1907.
12 F. Siemieński, Prawo konstytucyjne, Warszawa–Poznań 1976, pp. 20–21, 40–45.
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legal genesis of a new authority”.13 Let us add that he considered it reasonable to 
look at the problem of operation of the KRN and the PKWN in the Schmittian 
perspective, even though no one would have dared at that time to formally refer to 
Carl Schmitt’s theses to support the legitimisation of communist rule.
These views of state law specialists were intended to sanction the actual and 
quasi-legal status of the KRN.14 In line with the postulates of the Polish Workers’ 
Party, they treated it as the current state authority, necessary for the working people 
to gain power and adopt new, revolutionary laws. Moreover, S. Rozmaryn also noted 
that the PKWN was established by the authorized will of this legislative entity.15 Its 
position within the political system was not to be that of the government (within the 
meaning of the March Constitution), but, following the example of Soviet systemic 
transformations, it was given the character of an executive committee, which was 
later replaced with the Provisional Government. Interestingly, S. Rozmaryn stated 
that the famous Manifesto issued by this committee had no statutory character, as 
it was not passed by the KRN, which at that time had the exclusive right to adopt 
acts of this level.16 The legal nature of the July Manifesto was basically reduced to 
13 K. Grzybowski, Ustrój Polski współczesnej 1944–1948, Kraków 1948, p. 13, as cited in 
R. Jastrzębski, Powstanie i działalność Prezydium Krajowej Rady Narodowej (1944–1947), [in:] 
Z historii ustroju i konstytucjonalizmu Polski. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana w osiemdziesiątą 
rocznicę urodzin Profesora Mariana Kallasa, ed. D. Makiłła, collaboration M. Wilczek-Karczewska, 
Warszawa 1918, p. 363. K. Grzybowski (ibidem) also argued that the reintroduction of the March 
Constitution by the new rulers had, of course, a political rationale related to obligations towards the 
people, but the sanctioning (to a certain extent) of this act primarily resulted from such their will.
14 It is worth mentioning here an interesting (and unusual for the political narrative of that 
time) statement by another Polish researcher – Adam Wendel (KRN i PKWN – pierwsze władze 
Polski Ludowej, „Rocznik Lubelski” 1959, vol. 2, p. 18, 20), who treated the KRN as an “illegal” 
underground political entity, effectively seeking to take over the role of “the rule of souls” from the 
still “legal” London-based centre of power. At the same time, when pointing to the importance of 
the KRN, he quite freely assumed that the KRN had slurred over “the existence of the “legitimate” 
government-in-exile in London and spoke above its head, not from London, but […] from Warsaw, 
to the nation” and the whole world as the actual political representation of the nation. Moreover, 
according to that thinker, the legalisation of the KRN was legitimised not only by the will of the 
people, but also in the recognition of it by the authorities of the Soviet Union.
15 To be more specific, it is worth recalling here a now obvious thing that both the PKWN and 
the aforementioned Manifesto had been convened and written in Moscow at the order of Stalin. See, 
e.g., T. Żenczykowski, Polska Lubelska 1944, Warszawa 1990, p. 19.
16 S. Rozmaryn, op. cit., pp. 244–253. A Polish lawyer and author of pre-war comments on labour 
law and the Commercial Code, Doctor Zygmunt Fenichel, already explained in 1947 that the name 
“manifesto” referred to its form and content. This, as he stated, systemically significant document did 
not have the form of a statute to which he was accustomed. At the same time, he justified the use of 
such a form of the act (a form of political programme) by extraordinary times in which it was issued. 
He also stated when discussing the content of the Manifesto that the dispute between the London 
and Lublin Governments over the validity of pre-war constitutions was more political than legal. 
Importantly, he considered in this context that the establishment of the Government of National Unity 
after the negotiations in Moscow was ultimately intended to dispel doubts and give effect only to the 
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the level of “the programme of the people’s rule and the manifestation of the will 
of the organs representing this rule”.17 It did not matter much, as the Polish jurist 
expressed in the cited textbook the view that the ultimate factor determining the 
content of both legal norms and judicial decisions is the economic and social system, 
which in the case of the People’s Republic of Poland is an expression of the will 
of the working people. In this context, he pointed to a rather selective catalogue 
of the sources of state law in force in Poland at that time, under which, apart from 
the Constitutional Act of 19 February 1947 (along with the articles of the March 
Constitution explicitly referred to therein),18 he listed ordinary legislation, includ-
ing the acts of the KRN, decrees of the PKWN and the Provisional Government, 
statutory acts and other acts of equal force adopted under delegation of the April 
Constitution (despite the April Constitution having been declared unlawful and 
invalid) and some resolutions of the KRN adopted during the so-called conspiracy 
period, i.e. until 21 July 1944, which were to be the obvious source of later PKWN 
decrees.19 Although when presenting the sources of law, S. Rozmaryn confirmed 
the correctness of the principle of the hierarchy of normative acts established in 
constitutionalism, according to which the primacy was granted to the constitution 
and the compliance with it of other acts defining its essence, he mentioned at the 
same time that the content of the binding legal order (including the character of 
the Constitution of 1947) is more important than the types of forms in which it was 
expressed. He considered that as a rule there should be a dialectic link between them, 
but that there could be a dissonance during the transition period, especially when 
the legal form was not immediately adapted to the new socio-economic content 
arising from the needs of the working people.20 However, the freedom with which 
that professor pointed out a catalogue of existing sources of state law, especially 
in the conditions of the then incomplete regulation of the Constitution in terms of 
the political, social and economic system, unveiled a deliberate weakening of the 
authority of law. It has not only highlighted the arbitrary treatment of the formal 
conditions for the finality of legislative acts (including regarding the legitimacy 
March Constitution. In his article published in a specialist journal on legal practice, interpretation and 
administration of justice, he did not notice, as an experienced lawyer, a serious problem in violating 
formal procedures in terms of the validity or derogation of normative acts (including the constitution) 
and unreservedly accepted the need for changes in the political system. All the more so, the fact that 
the reorganisation of the State was carried out under a political decision of an entity that had not been 
constitutionally authorised and, in addition, undertaken in agreement with the authority of another 
State, did not raise his doubts whatsoever. See Z. Fenichel, Próba charakterystyki ustawodawstwa 
polskiego za okres 1944–1946, „Demokratyczny Przegląd Prawniczy” 1947, no. 1–2, pp. 69–70.
17 S. Rozmaryn, op. cit., p. 253.
18 Constitutional Act of 19 February 1947 on the organization and scope of activities of the 
highest organs of the Republic of Poland (Journal of Laws 1947, no. 18, item 71).
19 S. Rozmaryn, op. cit., pp. 248, 283–313.
20 Ibidem, pp. 297–308.




130 Ewa Kozerska, Katarzyna Dziewulska
of the legislative entity, the derivative character of powers of the authorities to 
adopt and repeal certain legal norms, the clear separation of the scope of matters 
reserved for regulation by the Constitution from those governed by ordinary legis-
lation or decrees), but also allowed granting the self-proclaimed legal authority the 
exclusive rights to interpret and test the compliance of a particular norm with the 
applicable legal order. S. Rozmaryn justified and thus sanctioned both the method 
of enactment and the substantive scope of the normative acts adopted by the new 
communist regime, considering that this was a necessary stage in the development 
of socio-economic relations of the Polish working class.21
A similar character had the explanations of another leading constitutionalist and 
judge of the State Tribunal in the period 1982–1985, Andrzej Burda. In his opinion, 
the KRN was established and acted as an actual and true political representation 
of the nation. As he argued, the establishment of this body was not based on the 
existing legal order, but resulted from a revolutionary act. What is significant in 
the narrative of this professor of constitutional law is that even though the KRN 
had no normative authorisation, it was itself a constitutional institution empowered 
to establish and define the functions of local national councils (considered as the 
“moral and legal” basis for the future state apparatus). At their inception, these 
bodies were to take on an institutional character through the causative power of 
KRN and thus constitute the political foundation for the revolutionary people’s 
power. He even stressed that the KRN was the only legal source of authority, whose 
sole and sufficient legitimacy was the fact that it had been appointed by a warring 
nation. Thus, in A. Burda’s view, it was considered a self-creating revolutionary 
body with supreme legislative authority, implementing the political programme 
of conscious working masses. To that end, the KRN undertook the struggle for 
its implementation, formulating new political principles and legal norms. In this 
context, he also justified the possibility of treating, by way of an exception, the will 
of the state expressed in a voluntary form (in other words, the will of a relevant 
state organ) as a direct source of law. A plausible reason for this special situation 
was to be the (temporary) revolutionary period of the emergence of new power.22
21 The open aversion of committed lawyers of the period of communist rule in Poland to both 
pre-war constitutions (especially to the Constitution of 1935) was supposed to perpetuate the convic-
tion of the need to breach the systemic continuity between the new regime and the pre-war Republic 
of Poland whose systemic solutions were not in line with the post-war revolutionary changes. See 
ibidem, p. 299.
22 A. Burda, Polskie prawo państwowe, Warszawa 1969, pp. 39–40, 116–118. Cf. K. Działocha, 
Rola konstytucji marcowej w prawie państwowym Polski Ludowej, „Przegląd Prawa i Administracji” 
1976, vol. 8, [in:] Prawo konstytucyjne na przestrzeni lat. Wybór publikacji profesora Kazimierza 
Działochy z okazji jubileuszu 85 urodzin i 60-lecia pracy naukowej, ed. A. Łukaszczuk, Warszawa 
2018, pp. 35–53.
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As we can see also in the case of A. Burda, the legitimisation of the authority 
of the KRN (and the PKWN) was supposed to result from the fictitious will of the 
“nation at war”, and more specifically from the need and force of the decisions 
of the “conscious working masses”. However, it is difficult to suppose that both 
A. Burda and the previously mentioned jurists actually believed that such a will 
of the nation actually existed. It is more likely that they derived their theses from 
post-Leninist categories which made it easier to reduce and equate the actions of 
the “conscious working masses” with the will of the communist party leadership, 
and in the Stalinist perspective, with the will of Stalin himself. The presented views 
of constitutionalists allow us to notice the implicit references to Machiavellian 
methods of gaining and maintaining power, as well as the Hobbesian (explicitly 
in the case of S. Rozmaryn) or Schmittian justification for the legitimacy of the 
authority by the circumstances of actual state of affairs (including with the use of 
violence).23 It is worth noting that both the communist lawyers, such as Andrzej 
Burda or Stanisław Rozmaryn, and those not directly associated with the Marxist 
ideology, such as Antoni Peretiatkowicz or Konstanty Grzybowski, concluded, in 
line with the thought of Thomas Hobbes, that the validity of law should be directly 
linked to the actual supreme political power, indirectly justified by the currently 
prevailing socio-economic conditions.24
The last of the scholarly statements about the legitimacy of the communist regime 
we would like to discuss here comes from the basic textbook on the history of the 
state and Polish law for many years of law students of the communist period.25 One 
of its authors, Michał Pietrzak, noted that the “revolutionary KRN” was established 
independently and in opposition to the Polish authorities existing both home and in 
exile. Importantly, this body (along with local national councils) was a political rep-
resentation of “part of the nation” and constituted provisional underground bodies of 
the people’s democratic state authority. The gradual process of liberating the Polish 
lands was allegedly supposed to be conducive to the establishment by the KRN of 
a committee known as PKWN, which actually performed all the functions of the 
government. Due to the fact that it exercised power in the liberated part of the country 
and enjoyed the support of the USSR, its situation was more favourable than that of 
23 See N. Machiavelli, Książę, Warszawa 1969, pp. 39–131; T. Hobbes, Lewiatan, czyli mate-
ria, forma i władza państwa kościelnego i świeckiego, Warszawa 2005, p. 253 ff. Cf. E. Kozerska, 
T. Scheffler, op. cit., pp. 65–70.
24 In this context, A. Peretiatkowicz (op. cit., pp. 57–58), an excellent specialist in Hans Kelsen’s 
work, accused the author of the normative theory of failing to notice the dependence between the 
state and the law or that he had not taken into account the possibility of social interpretation of law. 
It seems, however, that this accusation resulted from improper understanding of Kelsen’s theory. Cf. 
T. Scheffler, Recepcja doktryny prawnej Hansa Kelsena w Niemczech, [in:] Normatywizm Hansa 
Kelsena a współczesna nauka prawa, ed. A. Bosiacki, Warszawa 2017, pp. 145–146, 156–158.
25 J. Bardach, B. Leśnodorski, M. Pietrzak, Historia państwa i prawa polskiego, Warszawa 1979.
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the London government. This is so because M. Pietrzak stated that the assumption 
of power in Poland depended not only on the popular support in Poland, but also on 
the position of the great powers (which, except for the USSR, initially recognized the 
Polish London government). The author also emphasized that the PKWN, striving 
to ensure the public order necessary under the conditions of the time, proceeded to 
effectively create the state apparatus in the liberated territories (organisation of local 
administration, public security authorities, development of the Polish army, economic 
reforms). As he emphasized, despite a difficult situation, especially in the face of 
resistance from “far-right” organizations, both bodies gained social support, mainly 
from “politically conscious workers and some peasants”. Hence, the legal acts issued 
by the KRN and the PKWN embodied the people’s democratic revolution, which 
allowed for the extensive economic, social and political transformations announced 
in the manifesto.26 Once again, we are dealing with a subtle narrative, but still only 
a narrative, pointing to the alleged real necessity of socio-political transformations 
and the alleged social support as sources of the legality of the state power and its 
legislation. In this case, however, there was at least a realistic remark referring to 
international conditions. With a certain amount of good will, this can be interpreted as 
an expression of the awareness that the sources of the legality of the new government 
may be sought in the will of the Soviet regime.
We have mentioned above that S. Rozmaryn strengthened the questions of 
the legitimacy of post-war legislation with arguments borrowed from T. Hobbes, 
a thinker regarded at that time as “bourgeois”. It is worth noting here that a similar 
approach was presented at the time by Józef Litwin, a professor of administrative 
law. Both these jurists, in line with the view of the 17th-century English philosopher, 
referred to above, argued that the legislature (equated with the sovereign) non is 
cuius autoritate leges ab initio institutae sunt sed is cuius autoritate retinentur, 
and that it was that entity’s will (and not the provisions of some “legal” law or an 
authorised original lawmaker) that decided on the sustaining, amendment or repeal 
of a hitherto binding law. Therefore, important for them was not who made the 
law, but who sanctioned it.27 This thesis was also reflected in the judgement of the 
Supreme Court of 5 December 1950 (C 323/50) stating that the norms applicable 
in pre-war Poland lost their validity with the victory of the revolution, and only 
some of them were re-enacted in the post-war period. From that moment on, only 
selected legal acts sanctioned by the current authorities could serve the people’s 
rule and fulfilment of its tasks.28 Once again, we can see that the theory and practice 
of the post-war period pointed to the need to abandon the idea of succession of the 
26 Ibidem, pp. 622–627, 633–634. Cf. A. Burda, op. cit., pp. 109–113.
27 T. Hobbes, op. cit., p. 354. Cf. A. Peretiatkowicz, op. cit., p. 56.
28 J. Litwin, W sprawie mocy obowiązującej niektórych ustaw przedwojennych, „Palestra” 1957, 
no. 1/3, p. 16.
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legal system and promoted the concept of political and legal independence of the 
new revolutionary authority from the legacy of the Second Republic. Thus, from 
these views emerges a very quasi-positivist (in the Hobbesian meaning), or rather 
Schmittian approach to law, treated in categories of relativity and dependence on 
the authority of the current and actual (and not formal-legal) power.
In this context, one should briefly note the view expressed by well-known pre-
war commentator Zygmunt Fenichel, that the political and legal changes which 
took place in Poland between 1944 and 1947 had the character of a “peaceful 
social revolution”. As he explained, in the normative sphere, they were in line 
with “European tendencies to nationalise major branches of economy”. Thus, the 
author justified the post-war changes (in a rather simplified way, though) by trying 
to convince that it was not only in Poland that the legislature intervened, even at 
the expense of acquired rights, in those areas of life where it was allegedly required 
by the public interest. He argued, in line with the usual practice of the communist 
regime, that individual interests (e.g. the previously applicable principles of own-
ership right, freedom of contract) had to give way to collective needs in order to 
implement a “broad social agenda”.29 He thus confirmed F. Lassalle’s thesis that 
the legal order, including personal lawfully acquired rights, remained binding as 
long as the current balance of political power did not change or invalidate them. 
For the purposes of the realities of the time, he supported the thesis on the relative 
(unstable and uncertain) character of positive law, a law that was always dependent 
not so much on formal and legal conditions, but only on the discretionary will of 
those actually in power.
STATEMENTS BY SCHOLARS IN THE FIELD AFTER 1989
For several decades of the Polish People’s Republic, the above-presented man-
ners of proving the legality of the communist regime were in fact repeatedly used 
and established by renowned legal scholars recognized by the political authorities. 
Only after the changes of 1989, the gradual abolition of censorship and the intro-
duction of freedom of research allowed opinions that went beyond the communist 
schemes to emerge in Polish legal sciences. However, the formal collapse of the 
regime has not resulted in a significant intellectual ferment. For example, some 
constitutional law textbooks do not address these issues even marginally.30 Among 
the valuable statements on constitutional issues in this area, worth mentioning is 
the position of Professor Leszek Garlicki. His textbook points out that after World 
War II, a system of factual power developed on Polish lands, which, despite the 
29 Z. Fenichel, op. cit., pp. 72–73.
30 For example, see the textbook by B. Banaszak, Prawo konstytucyjne, Warszawa 2017.
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lack of constitutional or political legitimacy, established a new political order.31 
At the same time, he pointed out that the moment of proclamation of the KRN as 
a provisional parliament had been in a period of provisional solutions and following 
the recognition of the new authority by the Western powers and after the elections 
which were doubtful as to their fairness, the Constituent Assembly which adopted 
the so-called Small Constitution was convened. The constitutional provisions were 
in fact a façade that concealed the true governance system based on the principle 
of primacy of the communist party.32 Thus, although L. Garlicki referred to the 
actual and not legal origin of the new authority, he did not address the question of 
validity of the legislation adopted by that unlawful body at that time. Moreover, 
by remaining silent on this matter, he seems to accept the practice that has been in 
place since 1944. This is an attitude that is paradigmatic for current legal deliber-
ations on the legacy of the communist regime.
A similar, but not entirely identical narrative can be found in the statements 
of another person important for contemporary constitutional studies in Poland, 
Wiesław Skrzydło. In the study entitled Polskie prawo konstytucyjne (The Polish 
Constitutional Law),33 he noted, similarly to M. Pietrzak, that the establishment 
of two various administrative and military centres in the country was not accom-
panied by the same social support. The vast majority of the society supported the 
legalism of the government-in-exile with subordinated centres of power in Poland, 
recognizing their continuity. Left-wing milieux enjoyed support in narrower circles, 
but they gained power in the country owing to the international relations within 
the anti-Nazi coalition in its shape formed at the end of the war and to a lesser 
extent owing to internal socio-political relations.34 This view was a continuation 
of the earlier description of the events of 1944–1952 presented by W. Skrzydło.35 
This author admitted that the systemic transformations in Poland at the end of 
World War II resulted from external intervention, and even that the tendencies to 
cultivate the Polish political and legal traditions were effectively eliminated by 
31 Cf. K. Kersten, Narodziny systemu władzy. Polska 1944–1948, Paryż 1986, p. 70 ff. The author 
demonstrates that effective actions of the new authorities performed by force and fait accompli, led 
to abandoning the principle of legitimism by recognizing the KRN as the representative of the nation 
and to the appointment of a government dominated by the communists. According to historian of law 
M. Lipska (Aparat administracyjny PKWN, „Czasy Nowożytne” 2005, vol. 18–19, pp. 27–28, 34), 
from a purely legal perspective, the establishment of the KRN and the PKWN constituted a breach 
of the existing political system rules.
32 L. Garlicki, Polskie prawo konstytucyjne, Warszawa 2016, p. 26.
33 Polskie prawo konstytucyjne, ed. W. Skrzydło, Lublin 2005.
34 Ibidem, pp. 45–48. As a side note, it can be stated that in W. Skrzydło’s opinion, the PKWN was 
established formally by the KRN, which resulted from the decision taken in agreement with Stalin. As 
we know, it was not quite true, as the PKWN was established under a decision made by Stalin without 
any arrangements with the KRN. The KRN just “legalised” post factum the earlier event.
35 W. Skrzydło, Ustrój polityczny RP w świetle Konstytucji z 1997 roku, Kraków 2000, pp. 20–25.
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“the second current, completely foreign, influenced from outside […] and based 
on the Soviet model”,36 but he failed to juridically comment this statement. It is 
striking that W. Skrzydło’s study lacks any considerations regarding the legality 
or doubts as to the validity of normative acts issued by the KRN, the PKWN, the 
Provisional Government or the Sejm elected in 1947. Despite mentioning that the 
regime did not follow the theoretically accepted rules of the March Constitution, 
and that “completely foreign” models were introduced on which the Constitution 
of 1952 was based, the author does not question the validity and legality of the 
rules enacted by communists. Interestingly, the description of normative changes 
in the field of constitutional provisions was shaped by W. Skrzydło in such a way 
as to convince the reader that the Constitution of 1997 is normatively rooted in 
the systemic changes that took place in Poland after 1943. The only difference 
between the situation before 1997 and the new one was that the previous state 
“created a patchy picture”, because – especially in the recent period – it consisted 
of the so-called Small Constitution (the one adopted in 1992) and the provisions 
of the Constitution of 1952 retained in force, while the new Constitution of 1997, 
on the other hand, introduced an allegedly coherent state.37 Also in this case, the 
idea of rule of law, so widely and affirmatively discussed in further parts of both 
cited W. Skrzydło’s works, is suspended or forgotten when the communist heritage 
is concerned.
The issue of administrative structures in Polish lands west of Bug and San was 
also addressed by Robert Jastrzębowski. This author claimed that the creators of the 
communist regime wanted to develop a system different from that of the Second 
Republic of Poland. The KRN, which was established by a statute (without the prior 
consent of Stalin), from the very beginning denied the London government-in-exile 
the right to represent the Polish people. Its activities, including the establishment 
of the PKWN, depended heavily on the Soviet approval and the military-political 
situation. In this context, the July Manifesto was considered by R. Jastrzębowski 
as a political document whose declaration on invoking the basic principles of the 
March Constitution allowed selective reference to the provisions of this constitu-
tion in later practice. At the same time, the laws adopted in July and August 1944, 
finally built the model of political system for the period 1944–1947 contradicting 
the parliamentary system declared in the manifesto of 1944, and proclaimed the 
principle of unity of state power adopted in the 1952 Constitution. As he noted, 
the legal issues, especially the issue of binding force of the Constitution of 1921, 
virtually lost its importance with the entry into force of the Act on the system and 
the scope of operation of the supreme bodies of the Republic of Poland dated 
36 Ibidem, p. 21.
37 Ibidem.
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19 February 1947.38 Despite mentioning the arguments which, from the point of 
view of legality, discredited the KRN and the PKWN, also this author did not draw 
any broader conclusions as to the binding force of the legislative acts adopted by 
those bodies, nor did he attempt to confront his own observations with the concept 
of the rule of law and consequently to put forward postulates concerning the correct 
conduct of current judicial bodies towards the KRN and the PKWN functioning, 
after all, in the current normative order.
An interesting, but ultimately – as will be demonstrated – similar opinion on 
the activities of the KRN and PKWN was presented by historian of law Adam 
Lityński. He pointed out that the determination of the legal status of the “old- 
-and-new” Polish state (in the territories west of the Curzon Line, grabbed by the 
USSR but not incorporated into the USSR as a Soviet republic) is characterised 
by hesitation, discrepancies, as well as inconsistent behaviour aimed at giving it 
external appearances of a sovereign political entity.39 He assumed, in line with the 
proposal put forward by another well-known law historian, Marian Kallas, that 
Poland since 1944 had been under an illegal “special occupation” (a specific form 
of military occupation), characterised by the fact that, although its territory was 
not declared by the USSR to be annexed, there was full dependence on Moscow 
both informally in the factual acts of the “red army” and in the decision-making 
activities of the newly created power structures.40 At the same time, according to 
A. Lityński, the new authorities under Soviet supervision wanted to keep up the 
appearances of legality of power gained. As he stated, the takeover of power was 
not supposed to look like a revolution, but rather an evolution. According to him, 
this appearance resulted from the war conditions and the international situation, 
then favourable to the government-in-exile.41 A. Lityński admitted unequivocally 
38 R. Jastrzębski, op. cit., pp. 360–363, 370–371. Cf. M. Szulc, Prezydium Krajowej Rady Na-
rodowej w systemie ustrojowym państwa polskiego (1944–1947), https://depotuw.ceon.pl/bitstream/
handle/item/1681/2200-DR-PR-30809.pdf?sequence=1 [access: 22.11.2019], pp. 40–42, 235.
39 A. Lityński, Początki resortu sprawiedliwości PKWN. W 70. rocznicę, „Roczniki Administracji 
i Prawa” 2014, vol. 14(1), pp. 85–86.
40 M. Kallas, A. Lityński, Historia ustroju i prawa Polski Ludowej, Warszawa 2003, p. 29.
41 Cf. a similar view of a renowned historian, Professor Andrzej Friszke (PKWN – próba oceny, 
„Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość” 2005, no. 2, pp. 19–21). In addition, Professor Janusz Wrona (System 
polityczny w Polsce w latach 1944–1948, „Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość” 2005, no. 2, pp. 52–56, 67), 
a historian, stated that the year 1944 had been the start of the process of establishing a totalitarian 
state in Poland. As it seems, it is difficult to consider this new state a successor of the solutions from 
the Second Republic, especially from the period governed by the March Constitution. On the other 
hand, Professor Andrzej Paczkowski (PKWN – próba oceny, „Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość” 2005, no. 2, 
pp. 18–19) shared a controversial view that there had been a legal, symbolic and institutional con-
tinuity between the PKWN and the Second Polish Republic. Although he admitted that the pre-war 
regulations had been treated selectively and instrumentally but he argued that they played a significant 
persuasive role in the original period of the new authorities. He also argued that the real “breakaway” 
in formal and legal terms took place in the years 1949–1950, and ultimately in 1952, not in 1944.
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that the appointment of the PKWN had been an illegal act and the issuance of 
the manifesto was deprived of legal sanction, and that these methods indicated 
a lack of restraint in achieving the intended goal. This was also the purpose of the 
Manifesto, the political and systemically significant formula of which, deliberately 
ambiguous and poorly fit for legal use,42 built the justification for the validity of 
the Constitution of 1921. In fact, its unclear and vague message regarding the le-
gal continuity of the old system was to be a camouflage for the legitimacy of the 
new authority and provided it with a normative basis for the legality of its actions. 
The more so because the Manifesto – as A. Lityński argued – was treated by the 
communists as an act of constitutional nature. Thus, according to the author, the 
legalistic concept of the continuity of the legal order was a general rule devised 
for the needs of the political game (exceptions were military criminal law and mil-
itary judicial institutions, illegally established in 1943 in the USSR and modelled 
on Soviet solutions).43 This strategic idea made it possible to undertake actions 
which only partially and selectively upheld the pre-war laws and institutions. It 
was only after the elections of 1947 when this narrative was abandoned, as there 
was no need to worry about the position of the former allies and the international 
opinion. Thus, no illusions left as to the continuity of the system in any normative 
and practical space.44 Also in this case, however, in A. Lityński’s opinion, there was 
no statement what are the legal consequences of such unambiguous arrangements 
as to the unlawfulness of structures established by the communists. 
Another important publication addressing the legislative activities of the 
post-war regime in Poland is a study by Marcin Wiącek. In this interesting dis-
sertation, however, the author stipulated that he “does not undertake to carry 
out a multifaceted assessment of the events related to the assumption of power 
by the communists”, but he only refers to the positions of post-war recognized 
lawyers for the purposes of the study. His intention was to draw attention to the 
selective approach of the Polish communist authorities to the application of the 
March Constitution with simultaneous rejection of the possibility of sanctioning 
the Constitution of 1935. In this context, M. Wiącek, at the level of declarations, 
put aside the question of determining the status of the KRN and the PKWN and 
examining their legality, focusing rather on discussing the system of sources of law 
created by those authorities. Although he stated in a definitely negative tone that 
the powers of those bodies had not resulted from applicable pre-war constitutional 
42 Cf. K. Działocha, J. Trzciński, Zagadnienie obowiązywania konstytucji marcowej w Polsce 
Ludowej. 1944–1952, Wrocław 1977, p. 16.
43 A. Lityński, op. cit., p. 86 ff.
44 A detailed analysis, especially from the perspective of judicial law, is provided in: A. Stawarska- 
-Rippel, Prawo sądowe Polski Ludowej 1944–1950 a prawo Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej, Katowice 
2006, p. 21 ff.
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norms (and in the initial period of the KRN’s activity there were loopholes in the 
detailed rules of legislative procedure), since they used to invoke in their revolu-
tionary slogans mainly the will of the masses, he failed to draw legal conclusions 
from this. M. Wiącek just accepted as a relevant fact that those authorities had 
considered themselves (as he mentioned: rather on their own) to be empowered to 
take decisions in the field of public authority and that they had granted themselves 
the right to make such acts. Thus, despite the apt thesis on the unconstitutionality 
(and probably also illegality, but M. Wiącek is not quite unequivocal here) of these 
people’s sovereign entities, but this author did not see reasons to challenge the 
binding force of their legislative activities. Starting from a seemingly formal and 
positivist position, he accepted that the current constitution-makers of the Third 
Republic did not equip the judicial authorities with instruments that prevent chal-
lenging the legislative legitimacy of the KRN and the PKWN only because of the 
circumstances in which they had assumed power and their lack of legitimacy in 
the pre-war constitutions. This is a rather controversial thesis in the context of the 
rule of law.
As we mentioned, M. Wiącek considered it a fact that if a given act is issued 
by an entity authorised in the period of the People’s Republic of Poland to do so, 
then such a document should be accepted as binding, regardless of the fact that 
these bodies have independently granted themselves legislative powers. At the same 
time, he noticed that both the legislature and the case law of the then regime were 
equivocal about the validity of pre-war law and seemingly applied the Hobbesian 
principle that the force of this law did not result from respect for the continuity 
of law, but from the will of the current legislature. An attitude was even taken at 
that time, according to which the authorities, mainly courts, decided not to apply 
a specific regulation (except in situations of a clear derogation) on the basis of 
alleged objective axiological conditions. Thus, in his opinion, it is impossible to 
precisely determine which pre-war legal acts were binding. Regarding acts that were 
newly adopted by the communist government, M. Wiącek’s reservations mainly 
concerned the July Manifesto. He took a position to negate its normative character, 
which he justified by the fact that before 22 July 1944, the new authority had only 
granted legislative powers to the KRN and established a specific form of issuing 
binding legal acts. Moreover, he admitted that the content of that act was too gen-
eral and ambiguous. The Manifesto was only a propaganda declaration to provide 
arguments for the illegality of the London government and its ostensible basis in 
the international constitutional tradition. However, as the author argued, it did not 
establish legal norms, but confirmed the existing factual state, and also contained 
an announcement of a specific manner of action of emerging state organs. More-
over, he stated that the provisions of the Manifesto on the validity (or invalidity) 
of the pre-war constitutions should not be treated as legal norms. The more so as 
the later practice freely recognized individual institutions regulated by the Consti-
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tution of 1921 according to the assumed political goals.45 According to M. Wiącek, 
it is also worth noting that the constitution-makers of the Third Polish Republic 
clearly distanced themselves from the axiology of the system from before 1989, 
while having an attitude that the effectiveness of the legal order originating from 
the KRN and the PKWN (including that derogating the April Constitution) cannot 
be challenged. These systemic changes were introduced through an amendment, 
and not a rejection or declaration of invalidity of the constitutional norms of the 
People’s Republic of Poland. Thus, he stated that it is not admissible for the current 
law-applying authorities to derive legal effects from the lack of the constitutional 
legitimacy of the bodies of the People’s Republic of Poland, and thus they should 
be allowed to settle cases in which it is necessary to refer to the constitutional 
model “applicable” at that time. He also argued that in order to assess the events 
of the period of 1944–1952 (on the basis of the constitution in force), a compro-
mise position should be adopted, in line with the case law of the Constitutional 
Tribunal,46 sanctioning the legal norms that have formally been expressed in the 
acts issued by the then authorities (including those referring to regulations of the 
Constitution of 1921) and forming the legal system of the People’s Republic of 
Poland. However, he rightly notices that the legal scholarly literature and case law 
did not develop a coherent concept that would enable the determination of specific 
normative (constitutional) model rules that would allow legal practitioners to assess 
legal events and behaviours that occurred in the first years of communist Poland. 
Adopting such a method, especially through inter-temporal and validation decisions 
or constitutional regulations, would serve to systematise and thus avoid divergences 
in the constitutional argumentation used in cases before the Constitutional Tribu-
nal and common courts.47 It can be easily noticed that the opinions expressed by 
M. Wiącek assume the necessity in a state governed by the rule of law to suspend 
its principles regarding the heritage of communist Poland.
An interesting assessment of the legality of the KRN and the validity of its 
legislative activities was provided by the above-cited Z. Wawak. In his opinion, 
the system which emerged in the period 1944–1952 did not have revolutionary 
origins: neither under the traditional approach, i.e. resulting from the will of the 
masses or the nation (or part of it), nor under the Marxist approach associated with 
the conscious, necessary stage of development of the socio-economic formation. 
These violent, revolutionary transformations were, in fact, a coup forcibly carried 
out against the legal authorities. Such an attitude does not, however, grant legit-
imacy to exercise power, since it would be a method for justifying any violence. 
45 M. Wiącek, Znaczenie zastosowania konstytucji marcowej w Polsce Ludowej dla orzecznictwa 
sądów i Trybunału Konstytucyjnej III RP, Warszawa 2012, pp. 88–112.
46 Cf. decision of the Constitutional Tribunal of 13 March 2013, SK 38/12.
47 M. Wiącek, op. cit., pp. 255–260.
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What is also important, it was only the need to win social support that encouraged 
the new government to make fictitious references to the legal continuity with the 
Second Polish Republic (excluding the binding force of the Constitution of 1935). 
He stressed that the KRN did not had the power to adopt a new constitution and 
to reject the previous constitution. The Polish lawyer also disagreed with the posi-
tion that an agreement made by foreign countries (especially the Yalta conference 
agreements) or the international recognition (especially by fait accompli) of the 
new authority guaranteed its constitutional continuity of the normative internal 
order. Moreover, he argued that the pre-war legal order had ceased to be binding 
by facts (and by the law of the jungle) created by the communist power “installed” 
and supported by the Soviets. Thus, he unequivocally proved that the lack of legal 
legitimacy of the KRN undermined the foundations of all the legislation adopted by 
this authority. Subsequent constitutions (from 1947 and 1952) could not rectify this 
defect, as they derived their legitimacy from the order established by the Manifesto 
and the decisions of the KRN. This system is defective in constitutional terms (in 
the substantive aspect, the sovereign’s consent is missing, and in the formal aspect, 
the system lacks constitutional legitimism) and in international-law terms (a post 
factum recognition of the state de iure). Due to the fact that the system in force at 
that time was deprived of legal legitimacy and thus violated the substantive and 
formal principles of the rule of law, it became necessary in the state governed by 
the rule of law, according to Z. Wawak, to make a fundamental decision about 
its application. However, the finding of its illegality could not be accompanied 
by questioning the irreversibility of its legal consequences. It was necessary, as 
Z. Wawak argued, to analyse the provisions of that period in view of their com-
pliance with the assumptions of law of the Republic of Poland. Hence, some legal 
acts of the People’s Republic of Poland, even those that are not binding, should be 
considered null and void ex tunc (by applying the institution of annulment without 
challenging the irreversible legal effects resulting from a ruling or decision), as 
well as making a substantive reconciliation of the applicable legislation with the 
current Constitution, and finding a systemic solution of compensation to victims 
of the communist system, combined with moral redress.48 Rational Z. Wawak’s 
opinions, which allowed approaching to the idea of the rule of law in a serious 
way (and not as a kind of juridical ornament), did not receive due attention of 
the scholars in the field. The “rhetoric of continuity” made it rather impossible to 
undertake an in-depth debate on the intellectual and normative heritage left behind 
by the Soviet-established communist regime.
48 Z. Wawak, op. cit., pp. 53–62.




The State National Council and the Polish Committee of National Liberation… 141
CONCLUSIONS
It should be noted that after 1944 Poland was turned into a Soviet vassal, 
disregarding the formal principles of the rule of law, which were displaced by the 
coercive force of the Schmittian “concrete order”. The established political and 
normative system had no constitutional legitimacy and did not even aspire to main-
tain continuity with the pre-war system. The new communist power, authorised 
by force and not by a legal or social basis, gave itself the competence to establish 
a normative order. From the point of view of the idea of rule of law, the lack of 
legitimacy for lawful governance and legislative activity undermined, in principle, 
the systemic and legal status of the bodies of communist authority. This was all 
the more so because the system of unitary power created at that time, restrictions 
on personal and civil rights, as well as the use of terror, showed that a totalitarian 
state modelled on the Soviet Union was under construction. The events and legal 
developments of the time led to numerous, often radical changes in many areas 
of private and public life. They caused specific social and material consequences, 
which are difficult to reverse today and still affect Polish society. Its many members 
expect restitution of property and fair treatment as a condition sine qua non for 
the rule of law. In this aspect, especially on the part of intellectual elites, including 
political and legal communities, a need arises to reflect on every usurpatory and 
arbitrary action of the entities which illegally took over power in Poland in 1944. 
The consequences of their systemic legal, social and economic solutions are in many 
cases the still unsettled aftermath of that regime. Therefore, the currently cherished 
ideal of a state governed by the rule of law requires that the public authorities un-
dertake comprehensive and effective measures for the just and equitable redress 
of material and moral damage undoubtedly inflicted by the communist regime. 
The more so, because – as we have shown in the article – the established scholarly 
opinion (and the case law49) has not managed to develop a position coherently 
linking the People’s Republic of Poland with the present legislation, even if only by 
referring to the “Radbruch’s formula”. This seems even more important that some 
regulations of the communist government, especially those concerning changes in 
the ownership structure, are still in force and form the basis for judicial decisions 
of common courts and the Constitutional Tribunal.
49 See E. Kozerska, T. Scheffler, op. cit., pp. 65–70.
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ABSTRAKT
Ustanowienie reżimu komunistycznego w 1944 r. w Polsce stanowi w doktrynie oraz w prakty-
ce legislacyjnej i orzeczniczej aktualny przedmiot refleksji. Nie wypracowano bowiem jednolitego 
stanowiska wobec tych wydarzeń, co powoduje, że usankcjonowany wówczas porządek polityczno- 
-normatywny nadal skłania do kontrowersyjnych ocen i przede wszystkim wywołuje określone skutki 
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prawne. Wynika to z faktu, że nowa ludowa władza, umocowana siłową, a nie prawną czy społeczną 
podstawą działania, sama nadała sobie kompetencje do stanowienia porządku normatywnego. Brak 
legitymacji do prawowitego panowania i działalności legislacyjnej w zasadzie – z punktu widzenia 
idei państwa prawa – podważa status ustrojowo-prawny organów władzy ludowej, tym bardziej że 
stworzony wówczas system jednolitej władzy i źródeł prawa świadczyły o budowaniu wzorowanego 
na Związku Radzieckim państwa totalitarnego. Ówczesne zdarzenia i zachowania prawne doprowa-
dziły do licznych, często radykalnych zmian w wielu płaszczyznach życia prywatnego i publicznego. 
Ponadto wywołały określone, trudne dziś do odwrócenia skutki społeczne i materialne, z którymi 
wciąż mierzy się polskie społeczeństwo. Współczesne standardy państwa prawa stawiają zatem wy-
móg podjęcia kompleksowej i skutecznej aktywności przez władzę publiczną w zakresie słusznego 
i sprawiedliwego naprawienia szkód materialnych oraz zadośćuczynienia strat moralnych powstałych 
w wyniku panowania tego ustroju. Wydaje się to tym bardziej istotne, że niektóre regulacje władzy 
ludowej, zwłaszcza dotyczące zmian struktury własnościowej, nadal obowiązują oraz stanowią 
podstawę orzeczeń sądowych i Trybunału Konstytucyjnego.
Słowa kluczowe: Krajowa Rada Narodowa; Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego; Polska; 
reżim komunistyczny
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